Abstract Community groups such as those involved in food trading, micro-finance and road building can play an important role in sustaining the livelihoods and reducing poverty in rural Africa. While many groups collapse without donor support, the factors that allow some groups to be sustained are examined by looking at a range of community development related groups. The use of subsidies is questioned as it can result in groups becoming dependent on donors. The ability to build up trust and cooperation is shown to be based on long-term learning processes, simple flexible rules established by members, the ability to enforce rules and allowing people to manage their own income.
Introduction
A common theme running through the past forty years of community and rural development intervention in Africa has been the formation and support of group activities. The interest in group-based activities has waxed and waned with a recent increase in the promotion of self-help groups and projects with a 'community development' component (Stringfellow et al., 1997) . Group activities are required in many World Bank funded projects and Lucey (1997) estimates that 50% of British-aid-supported natural resource sector programmes incorporate a component of self-help organization. Group activities in remote rural areas can contribute to community development and reduce poverty through allowing members to have greater control of their own livelihoods, opening new economic opportunities and empowering people to determine their own priorities and organize themselves. However, the benefit derived from groups is not always distributed evenly with some individuals excluded or not able to participate. This paper examines a number of group activities and local responses of resource-poor farmers that allow them to cope with the vagaries of global and domestic markets (Craig et al., 2000) . There is a need for a 'view from below' to see what exists and works now, and how external agencies can build on it. The examples of cooperation, and constraints to collective action that rural Ghanaians face can indicate some of the preconditions and processes whereby cooperation can be built up. Drawing on this information, implications for government bodies and NGOs attempting to support rural development through group activities at the community level are identified.
Much of the literature on groups derives from successful case studies and concentrates on the benefits derived from community group action. There are assumptions that the benefits from working in groups will inevitably lead to the creation of groups (Granovetter, 1994) . This assumption is based on the impact of certain flagship, highly publicized, inspiring cases of 'best practice' community development that are reported uncritically, with details given of the multiple benefits, and a lack of attention paid to the processes by which the cooperation took place. Such optimism is in direct contrast to other approaches to conceptualizing collective action that take an equally extreme assumption of individual short-term self-maximising behaviour that undermines cooperation. The assumptions of both inevitable cooperation and individual maximization fail to explain the existence or lack of collective action.
This study draws on a survey carried out in off-road communities in Central and Brong Ahafo Regions of Ghana. These areas are characterized by considerable poverty and very small-scale agricultural production. The main problems of market access especially for remote areas include the high cost of transport, high transaction costs for farmers and traders (in terms of search, negotiating and enforcing contacts), poor information flows and weak bargaining power of the farmers.
The data collected and presented in this paper cover a range of group activities that shape market access in Central Region and Brong Ahafo Region, Ghana. 1 Surveys were carried out in villages using semi-structured interviews and participatory research methods with over 100 group members.
Community managed food-trading groups
Cooperation amongst farmers for negotiating prices with traders increases farmer bargaining power and empowers them to have greater control over setting prices. It also reduces the time and the cost of marketing. These groups have an impact on poverty through increasing local incomes and money flows in the rural economy, opening networks and opportunities outside the community, increasing rural employment and reducing migration to urban areas. Cases of group bargaining were found in many communities in Brong Ahafo when more than one vegetable farmer was selling. The farmers in a village may select between two to six farmers to represent them. The representatives are chosen for their knowledge of marketing, bargaining ability, public speaking skills and the confidence that other farmers have in them. Traders negotiate with the farmers' representatives who announce the price.
Price setting by cooperation can only work in periods of scarcity, when the farmers have more bargaining power. When there is glut, the perishable nature of some crops, notably tomatoes, means that some farmers will be forced to sell at any price or else risk losing the ripe produce if traders decide to buy from another village. This limits the practice of collective price bargaining to certain times of the year and is harder in those off-road locations that are not frequently visited by traders. However, there are communities that are off-road but have a reputation for growing a certain crop at a certain time.
Difficulties can arise if a farmer is under some obligation to a trader as part of a 'customer' relationship linked to the prior provision of credit. Farmers may be forced to sell at a lower price against the wishes of the farmer group. However, limiting the use of credit from traders is not possible as there are limited alternative credit sources available to vegetable farmers.
The ability of these groups to operate depends on the respect farmers have for the negotiators as it is up to these individuals to stop those farmers who are desperate to harvest from accepting a lower price. The farmers also have to believe and trust that the negotiator is trying to maximize the price for the farmer. There are often accusations that the farmers' representatives may bargain for a lower price and get a pay-off from the traders. One disgruntled young male farmer stated that 'the chairman did all the bargaining in his house . . . he took money from the traders and then beat the price down'.
The power of the committees depends on the unity of the village and the strength of the chief and elders. Those who break the rules can be fined and taken to the chief. Without this support, association leaders cannot enforce their own decisions, even when there are a large number of traders wanting to buy. In villages with disputes over the chieftaincy, the powers of the committees are particularly weak. One farmer from a village with chieftaincy disputes stated:
There is unrest here because of the recent crisis so it is often difficult to have one mouth piece. Here it would be best to get the leaders of both factions to negotiate but they have different interests and support different chiefs . . . If there are divisions then the leaders will do what their farmers want . . . some boys from the other faction will say 'we made the farm' and then jump on the trucks before the price has been set.
Community crop storage groups and micro-credit
In many cases small-scale farmers are trapped in a cycle of poverty as they have to sell their crops at harvest when prices are low and they cannot get affordable loans to allow them to invest in the following year's harvest. Banks are unwilling to lend to small-scale farmers due to the low repayment rate and the lack of collateral. Specific credit systems have been developed by NGOs to overcome these problems. Groups of maize farmers and palm oil processors are encouraged to store their produce at a purpose built store and then receive 70% of the market price at that time. When the market price rises after the harvesting period the produce can be sold and farmers are paid the value of their crop minus the initial credit and the cost of storage.
In the study area, the cases of inventory credit were limited to those groups receiving support and encouragement from NGOs. The concept is still being developed and has not been taken up by any of the financial institutions without the input of the NGO. The organization of the groups and how they function is carefully supervised and coordinated by NGO staff who play a key role in the functioning of these groups. Of crucial importance is the fact that there are two locks for the store. The group holds the key to one lock while NGO staff hold the other. The central role of the NGOs raises questions regarding the sustainability of the concept after the departure of the highly trained, motivated and mobile staff currently involved.
There are risks involved in using the inventory system. Firstly, farmers have to sacrifice flexibility in deciding when to use their money. For those in poverty there may be an urgent need for cash and no other source of funding. Other risks can come about if the cost of storage is not covered by the increase in market price. The palm oil processors who had taken out inventory credit reported that they had been pushed into debt. This was due to higher costs and lower market prices than had been expected, and the failure to collect payment for the oil that had been sold. As with other forms of joint liability and group borrowing, there are costs in terms of peer pressure, loss of trust and time taken in participating in group decision making (Marr, 1999) .
Community groups for improving market infrastructure and transport
While central and local government carries out major road building, communities play a key role in keeping the untarred roads usable. Through maintaining the roads, these community groups can encourage traders to visit the communities, get higher prices for their crops and therefore improve their livelihoods and the local economy. The maintenance is carried out by community organizations under the leadership of the chief. When there is a need to maintain the minor farm tracks, then those who farm in that area are organized by one of the elders. These institutions are also used for cleaning and building schools, and maintaining water supplies.
The members of the community cooperate as there is a moral obligation to work. Those who do not attend risk being fined C5000 2 (the same rate of hiring labour for farming for one day). The power to fine people is vested in the chief. To refuse to pay is considered a serious offence and rarely happens. The powers of the chief are based on the respect for the concept of chieftaincy and the need to retain good relations with community elders. The power of the chief can therefore be seen as being exerted by stopping people even thinking about shirking. Power is also exerted through monitoring the community members working together. In some communities the secretary to the unit committee also has a list of those eligible and marks down those who are absent. This all goes to support the moral obligation to cooperate. Power in these circumstances is accepted subconsciously and comes in the form of not making any decision but through acceptance of certain 'traditional' behaviour.
Factors attributing to group sustainability
Good incentives Groups will not work unless there are good incentives and individuals are convinced they will benefit personally (Kamara and Kargbo, 1999) . However, such benefits will not inevitably lead to successful community development groups. Strong incentives were found for cooperative marketing activities, storage and improving infrastructure. Attempts were found to be more constrained in remoter areas as the farmers have less bargaining power and the traders could dictate the marketing processes.
Attempts by external agencies to promote groups by giving incentives such as cheap credit are rarely sustainable since members often feel that there is no reason to remain in the group once the subsidy is removed.
Access to credit was often given by interviewees as the main reason for joining a group and is often linked to the belief that loans from the government are gifts.
Reduced risk of cheating
Cooperation within community groups is more likely to occur when there is a reduced risk of cheating and opportunism. The benefits of economies of scale through cooperative selling of produce are rarely realized because of the lack of standard weights, measures and quality standards that are trusted by the farmers, and the inadequacy of market information on fluctuating prices. The risks are reduced when there is transparency, and monitoring of other members. This is most commonly done by watching work being carried out or transactions taking place, by trusting the leaders of the group, or by establishing accounting procedures combined with member education. Risks are reduced with smaller numbers as it is easier to monitor, set rules and build trust (Ostrom, 1990) .
Simple flexible management
The management of groups becomes much more complex when groups act as a joint enterprise rather than a membership association offering services. Shared equipment and joint control of relatively large sums of money were not found to be taking place with the exception of those donor-funded projects that require group ownership of resources.
The management and decision-making style of groups has to be appropriate for the situation and build on existing accepted forms of decisionmaking. These may not be the consensual approach of a committee as promoted by the model of cooperative management that has been transplanted from Europe. The ability to manage cooperative activities also depends on the management skills that have been built up from other group activities in the past.
The ability to cooperate may be seasonal, depending on the activities and production at that time. For example, the collective price negotiations were found to be appropriate in times of scarcity when the farmers who could grow had more bargaining power. Therefore groups need to be flexible and know when not to push for cooperation.
Trust
The ability of groups to be sustained depends on the ability to build up trust. Trust may be present among a group based on existing links such as kinship, although such groups tend to be limited in their scope. Trust can also be built up through working relationships (Lyon, 2000) . Wider participation within groups requires a long learning process that is often antithetical to donor projects which have numerical targets to reach. The process of group building requires self-selection of members and flexible rules set by the members. For example, collective price bargaining groups change the rules depending on the supply of produce and the number of traders coming to buy. This supports the findings of Dhesi (2000) that formal institutions have to complement the informal institutions. External support can be important especially for training and motivating the group in the early stages while trust is built up. However, this support is a form of subsidy, especially if the group becomes dependent on the supervisory roles of the external agency rather that group members building their own capacity to monitor and supervise leaders.
Leadership
The ability to manage more complex groups depends on the quality of the leadership, their willingness to sacrifice time and effort for the group's survival and the leadership experience they and group members have had in the past. This is a conclusion found in many other surveys of cooperatives (Mishra and Shah, 1992) . Therefore differences in the ability to manage groups will differ, depending on the history of group activities in the area. Remote areas may also suffer, and the survey found several cases of potential or existing dynamic 'social entrepreneurs' leaving the remote areas for more lucrative economic activities elsewhere. The leaders have to be trusted to represent the group and to act as intermediaries between group members especially when there are disputes. The models of leadership used are often drawn on many traditional institutions. In this way group leaders can use the behaviour and dispute-settling strategies that are fully understood and known by all the members.
Enforcement and ability to punish
The cases of long-term self-sustaining groups also show the importance of enforcement of rules and the ability to punish, especially in the bigger groups. The role of chiefs was found to be particularly important and cooperation was severely limited in those settlements where there was a chieftaincy dispute. Mishra and Shah (1992) also discuss the constraints on cooperation in faction-ridden communities. Other ways of enforcing rules is through peer pressure and shaming people. These require the wider community to apply sanctions to those who are deemed to have broken the rules.
Conclusion
The cases discussed in this paper demonstrate that community groups can have a positive impact on poverty through strengthening rural livelihoods.
Based on the potential for benefiting the poor, donor programmes have been keen to encourage group activities. However, many of the groups that are established are not sustained once donor funding is removed. Attempts to promote group activities should consider the following points.
1 Groups are not a panacea and are unlikely to prosper if they are merely a requirement for projects. Groups should be considered as one alternative way to support sustainable rural livelihoods if the conditions are supportive, the activities appropriate and the time frame realistic. Group activities do take time to develop and allowances need to be made for this in shorter-term projects with the need for numerical targets to be met quickly. It should also be noted that groups can also have negative impacts on social development. 2 Best practice is not easily replicable and there is also a need to report on failed group activities and learn lessons from them. The group should decide group structures themselves and draw on existing models that are known within their communities. Support for groups should start by understanding the reasons behind the success of existing groups in the community and ensuring that any recommendation or intervention is based on existing formal and informal institutions. 3 The process can be supported through training of members and potential group leaders in management, accounting and the value of transparency. However, too much supervision can make the group unsustainable as group members rely on the monitoring and leadership of external support staff rather than building their own capacity to monitor and trust each other. 4 Some activities are harder to carry out as groups than others.
Sharing farms and equipment was found to be a particularly difficult group activity. The successful group activities were found to be those that allowed individuals to manage their own income and come together for credit, training and marketing services.
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